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ABSTRACT: Using the unique data of analysts’ site visits to Chinese listed companies, we 
examine whether and how analysts’ site visits help improve their forecast performance. We find 
that the forecast accuracy of analysts improves after they visit the target firms and this 
improvement still holds after controlling for the concurrent change in the forecast accuracy 
of analysts who do not conduct site visits. Such an improvement is more pronounced for firms 
with better corporate governance; for more experienced analysts; and for firms with higher 
earnings volatility. Moreover, the improvement of forecast accuracy is less pronounced when 
current site visits are preempted by preceding site visits, and when there are other non-analyst 
visitors. Furthermore, we find that local analysts benefit more from corporate site visits than non-
local analysts. Lastly, we document a larger market reaction to earnings forecasts issued 
by visiting analysts than those issued by non-visiting analysts. 
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1 Introduction 
In this study, we investigate whether financial analysts gain information advantage from a 
specific type of information acquisition activities, analysts’ corporate site visits to listed 
companies. This investigation directly answers the call for research on penetrating the “black box” 
of analyst work process (Call et al. 2013). The motivation for our research question is two-fold. 
First, although financial analysts are important information intermediaries in the capital markets, 
it is not well understood how exactly analysts benefit from their information acquisition 
activities. Such a lack of knowledge is primarily due to the lack of data on analysts’ information 
acquisition activities. Prior research generally uses indirect proxy for analysts’ information 
acquisition efforts such as the forecast frequency and the number of firms followed by an analyst 
(Jacob et al. 1999). Recently, some studies use analysts’ activities to identify information 
advantage possessed by certain analysts. For example, recent studies by(Green et al. 2012) and 
(Mayew et al. 2013) find that analysts who host investor conferences or ask questions in 
conference calls possess superior information. However, such evidence is indirect and is subject 
to alternative explanations. After all, there are many other analysts in the investor conferences 
and conference calls and every participant should benefit from managers’ discussions. Thus, it is 
unclear that the source of superior information is attributable to some analysts’ activities in these 
conferences. In addition, it is likely that analysts with superior information are more likely to 
host conferences and ask questions in conferences. In this paper, we study analysts’ corporate 
site visits and they better capture analysts’ information acquisition activities.  
Second, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) prohibits selective disclosure and as a result, 
financial analysts cannot rely on personal relationship to obtain information from the 
management in the post Reg FD period (Chen and Matsumoto 2006; Cohen et al. 2010). As a 
2 
 
result, selective access has become more and more important for financial analysts to acquire 
information. There is very limited evidence regarding how selective access influences market 
professionals, and it remains underexplored in the literature how selective access events affect 
analysts’ information advantage (Bushee et al. 2011; Green et al. 2012). Selective access is 
defined as the opportunity for analysts to meet privately with management in individual or small 
group settings (Bushee et al. 2011). Typical selective access events include one-on-one meetings 
at investor conferences (Bushee et al. 2011) and corporate site visits to company headquarters 
and manufacturing facilities (Cheng et al. 2013).2 To date, there is no empirical evidence 
regarding how site visits can benefit analysts in their research. This is surprising given the 
increasing importance of corporate site visits. As indicated in the 2012 All-Europe Research 
Survey, a site visit is an important type of information acquisition activity.3 Two recent papers 
document that site visits convey useful information into the capital market (Solomon and Soltes 
2013; Cheng et al. 2013). However, the mechanism through which the information is 
incorporated into the capital markets is unclear. This study aims to complement these studies by 
examining the relationship between site visits and analysts’ information advantage.  
The lack of research in this area is mainly due to the lack of data. In the U.S., site visits 
data are not available: firms either do not maintain archival records of site visits, or they prohibit 
distributing such information (e.g., Soltes 2012). The research opportunities emerged in China 
recently. Since 2009, the China’s Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) has required the listed 
companies to disclose the information on investors’ site visits in the annual reports, including 
visit dates, the names of visiting institutions, and the contents of discussion during site visits. 
                                               
2 In the SEC round table discussion on Reg. FD, Chairman Harvey Pitt commented that companies should still allow 
site visits such that investors can visit their headquarters or plants and ask operating managers questions. 
3 This survey shows that among the 12 types of popular information acquisition activities, investors rank corporate 
site visits (ranked No. 6) higher than one-on-one meetings with the management (No. 7), analysts’ written reports 
(No. 8), and analysts’ earnings estimates (No. 12).  
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This mandatory disclosure requirement provides us with a unique setting to test how analysts 
benefit from their corporate site visits. While acknowledging that institutional differences 
between China and the U.S. may limit the generalizability of our findings to the U.S., we want to 
point out that China has followed the U.S. version of Reg. FD by mandating that if an issuer 
discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons, it must make public 
disclosure of that information.4 Also, our findings in the Chinese context are important in their 
own right given China’s increasingly important role in the world economy.  
Analysts are likely to gain new, credible information about a firm through their corporate 
site visits to this firm because they are able to view this firm’s fixed assets, look over its 
inventory warehouses, observe its operating and R&D activities, and talk to middle- or low-level 
employees. The obtained information is credible because it is difficult for the firm to hide or fake 
real corporate activities and assets. Thus, we hypothesize that visiting analysts obtain 
information advantage through site visits. Specifically, we conjecture that the forecast accuracy 
of visiting analysts improves after their site visits. However, it is possible that visiting analysts 
might not receive any useful information. Site visits might be corporate events for public 
relations or entertainment purposes. Furthermore, visitors usually do not meet with top managers 
during site visits.5 Therefore, if the top managers are the only reliable source of information, 
visitors will not gain any useful information. Thus, it remains an empirical question on whether 
site visits are correlated with superior analyst forecast performance.  
 To examine our conjecture that corporate site visits are correlated with improved forecast 
                                               
4 According to the Article 41 of the CSRC’s Reg FD, which was effective on January 31, 2007, “A listed company 
shall, holding conference calls, analysts’ meetings, road shows, accepting investors’ field investigation, etc., 
communicate with the institutions and individuals in respect of the business operations, financial status and other 
events, but it shall not provide any inside information.” 
5 According to many corporate site visit policies that we went through, board secretaries or securities affairs 
representatives are usually the liaison persons for site visits and they are responsible for approving site visit 
applications, organizing the field tours, and accompanying the visitors during the entire site visit. 
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accuracy, we adopt a difference-in-difference research approach using the non-visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy as the control for the possible concurrent factors which affect all analysts’ 
forecast performance for the same firm. Such a research design also helps to mitigate the concern 
that some firm characteristics are omitted correlated variables. Specifically, we utilize the 
visitors’ names as disclosed for every site visit to a firm and classify the analysts following this 
firm as two groups for such a site visit event: the group of visiting analysts from the brokers 
whose names are identified as visitors; and the group of non-visiting analysts who follow the 
same firm but their brokers’ names are not on the visitors’ list. For each group of analysts, we 
calculate the average analyst forecast accuracy in the pre-visit period and also the post-visit 
period. Then, we calculate the change in forecast accuracy for these two analyst groups around 
each site visit and use it as the main variable for our regressions (i.e., for every site visit, we have 
two observations of forecast accuracy improvement; one for visiting analysts and the other for 
non-visiting analysts). According to our main research hypothesis, we expect to see an 
improvement in forecast accuracy of visiting analysts after controlling for the concurrent change 
in non-visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy.    
Our sample consists of 4,947 site visits occurring in 1,437 firm-years of 845 unique firms 
during 2009-2012, after requiring the earnings forecasts issued by both visiting and non-visiting 
analysts. Consistent with our hypothesis, we document improved forecast accuracy (i.e., 
decreased absolute forecast errors) in the post-site-visit period for visiting analysts, even after 
controlling for the change in non-visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy around the site visits. To 
provide additional insights on the information role of site visits, we conduct cross-sectional 
analyses for several factors which are expected to influence the costs and benefits of paying a 
site visit to a firm. First, the information advantage of visiting analysts should be more 
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pronounced when the cost of acquiring new information during the site visit is lower. We expect 
that well-governed companies are more open to visitors’ questions and are less likely to hide 
information or even provide misleading information during the site visits, which reduces 
information acquisition costs. Using board independence and the CEO-Chairman duality to 
measure corporate governance, we find stronger improvement in visiting analysts’ forecast 
accuracy for firms with better corporate governance. In the second cross-section analysis, we 
examine whether visiting analysts’ forecast accuracy improves more when these analysts possess 
a longer firm-specific experience. We conjecture that visiting analysts with a longer experience 
have a lower information processing cost and hence obtain a more pronounced information 
advantage through site visits. The results are consistent with our conjecture.  
The expected benefit of site visits are expected to be correlated with the existing 
information uncertainty for firms’ performance and also with the richness of the information 
content during site visits. Specifically, when a firm’s earnings performance is more volatile 
(proxied for by the standard deviation of earnings), the information obtained from site visits will 
be more useful for earnings forecasts. In the third cross-sectional analysis, we show consistent 
evidence that visiting analysts have a greater improvement in forecast accuracy relative to that of 
non-visiting analysts for firms with higher standard deviation of net income. In the fourth cross-
sectional analysis, we measure the information richness of site visits as the market share of the 
visited firms. By visiting the leading firms in an industry, analysts acquire not only firm-specific 
information but also the knowledge of the industry trend and/or the macroeconomic development. 
Such industry- and market-wide knowledge is important for analysts to make firm-specific 
earnings forecasts. Our results show that visiting analysts enjoy a more pronounced information 
advantage by visiting firms with larger market shares.  
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Furthermore, we expect that site visits are less likely to bring information advantage to 
visiting analysts when such site visits are preceded by any recent site visits by other investors, or 
when such site visits are not exclusive to visiting analysts (i.e., there are other visitors, mainly 
fund managers, in the same site visit trip as visiting analysts). In our fifth cross-sectional analysis, 
the empirical results support this expectation.  
One concern with our analyses is that whether the category of visiting analysts is merely 
the category of analysts who are geographically close to visited firms, given that prior studies 
document a higher likelihood of analysts visiting firms closer to their offices (Cheng et al. 2013) 
and that geographic proximity is documented as one determinant for the level of forecast 
accuracy (Bae et al. 2008). First, in our research design we examine the change in forecast 
accuracy around site visits and hence to a large extent we control for the fixed effect of 
geographic proximity on forecast accuracy. Second, we further address this concern by including 
geographic distance in our regressions. We find no significant results for geographic distance 
while the effects of site visit still exist. Interestingly, using the interaction item between site visit 
indicator and analysts’ geographic distance, we show that analysts benefit more from their site 
visits to firms located closer to their offices.  
Lastly, we examine the market reaction to earnings forecasts. Our evidence show that the 
three-day absolute abnormal stock returns around earnings forecasts are greater for visiting 
analysts than for non-visiting analysts. This evidence lends credence to our results based on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it provides direct 
evidence on the link between analysts’ information acquisition activities and their forecast 
performance. A large body of literature explores the factors associated with better analysts’ 
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forecast performance, including industry specialization (Jacob et al. 1999), firm-specific 
experience (Mikhail et al. 1997), superior access to management (Green et al. 2012; Soltes 2012), 
geographic proximity (Malloy 2005), and educational ties (Cohen et al. 2010). These studies 
focus more on analysts’ attributes-who they are, and less on what they do. However, the 
challenge of directly observing and measuring the effect of analysts’ information acquisition 
activities, partly due to the confidential nature of these activities, hinders researchers’ abilities to 
investigate the role of information acquisition activities in analysts’ forecast performance. Note 
that better forecast performance might come from analysts’ better skills in processing common 
information, not necessarily from analysts’ additional information acquisition activities. We take 
advantage of the mandatory disclosure of analysts’ corporate site visits in China and examine 
how such site visits can provide visiting analysts with an information advantage. 
Second, this study is related to a growing literature that examines how selective access to 
managers influences analysts’ performance. Two recent working papers show that private 
interactions with CEOs/CFOs can lead to analysts’ information advantage in the post Reg. FD 
era (Green et al. 2012; Soltes 2012). Complementing these studies, we provide evidence that in 
the absence of top executives as usually during site visits, analysts still obtain relevant 
information cues that help to improve forecast accuracy. In addition, compared with other 
selective access events, such as investor conferences, site visits are less contaminated by 
potential selective disclosure due to the usual absence of top executives during site visits.  
Third, our study contributes to the analyst forecast literature with respect to geographic 
proximity being a determinant of earnings forecast accuracy. Our study sheds light on the 
mechanism through which geographic proximity leads to information advantage. Prior studies 
show that local analysts issue more accurate forecasts than remote analysts, and this effect is 
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robust after controlling for the effects of common language and social ties among local people 
(Malloy(2005); (Bae et al. 2008). Our studies extend this literature by showing that the benefit of 
site visits for analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced with the geographic proximity 
between analysts and visited firms. Combined with the finding in prior studies that analysts are 
more likely to visit firms with a short geographic distance (Cheng et al. 2013), our study 
indicates how site visits serve as a mechanism through which local analysts can obtain the 
information advantage relative to non-local analysts for a listed firm.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the development of 
research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the empirical research design. Section 4 
reports the results from main analyses and Section 5 additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Analysts’ information acquisition and forecast performance 
Analysts are important capital market intermediaries that help reduce information 
asymmetry between companies and outside investors (e.g., O Brien and Bhushan 1990). Analysts’ 
superior forecast performance generally arises from these analysts’ active information 
acquisition and outstanding information processing skills. Prior literature has examined the effect 
of analysts’ efforts on their forecast performance but these studies usually rely on indirect 
proxies of information acquisition, such as industry specialization (Jacob et al. 1999) (Jacob et al. 
1999), firm-specific experience (Mikhail et al. 1997), and brokerage firm size(Clement 1999; 
Jacob et al. 1999). As a result, there is little direct evidence on how analysts’ information 
acquisition activities affect their forecast performance. Two recent studies find that analysts’ 
superior information is associated with their activities including hosting investor conferences 
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(Green et al. 2012) and asking questions in conference calls (Mayew et al. 2013). Since most 
analysts can attend these conference events which are not selective, other non-hosting or silent 
analysts should also collect the information in the same events and benefit from the information 
disclosed during the conferences. Therefore, the indicators of hosting conferences or asking 
questions might not reflect a higher level of information collecting activities in the conference 
events but could be good indicators for these analysts’ superior information access in a general 
situation.  
In other words, the effect of information acquisition activities is better captured by 
analyst-specific activities, not by analysts’ activities as a herd (i.e., all analysts’ activities at the 
same moment). Anecdotally, analysts actively engage in information acquisition activities 
through their visiting companies on site. A typical analyst hosts around one field trip per month 
in a medium-sized full-service broker-dealer (Groysberg et al. 2011). These field trips are 
analyst-specific efforts (i.e., it is clear that non-visiting analysts do not expend efforts on 
collecting information on site at the same moment) and thus the comparison between visiting and 
non-visiting analysts provides a better setting to examine analysts’ information acquisition 
activities.  
2.2 Corporate site visits and visiting analysts’ information advantage 
Reg FD prohibits executives from selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to 
market professionals or institutional investors. Reg. FD was implemented to address the public 
concern that managers provide material information to select investors, who then trade profitably 
at the expense of less informed investors. Prior studies show that Reg. FD achieves this goal of 
curtailing the selective disclosures. Specifically, the implementation of Reg. FD is associated 
with a shift toward a richer public information environment (Bailey et al. 2003; Heflin et al. 2003) 
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and a decrease in the informativeness of analysts’ reports (Gintschel and Markov 2004; Irani and 
Karamanou 2003; Mohanram and Sunder 2006). In the post Reg. FD period, the information 
leakage is curtailed in the period prior to management earnings forecasts (Kothari et al. 2009; 
Sinha and Gadarowski 2010), in the quarter before a break in a string of earnings increases (Ke 
et al. 2008), and in the closed conference calls after earnings announcements (Bushee et al. 2004). 
As a result, analysts have to rely more on other means to obtain information, including their 
corporate site visits.  
  We argue that analysts benefit from corporate site visits for the following reasons. First, 
analysts are able to observe firms’ operations; as the old adage goes, “seeing is believing.” 
During site visits, analysts can observe the productivity level of a company and ask questions 
about operation details, which is above and beyond a passive acceptance of whatever the 
company reports in the MD&A section of the annual reports. In addition, it is relatively easier for 
managers to manipulate the accounting numbers in the annual reports, but much more difficult 
for managers to fake real activities and assets such as manufacturing assemblies, loaded delivery 
trucks, and busy sales representatives. Therefore, through site visits analysts obtain credible 
information cues that are useful for them to conduct mosaic analysis and issue more accurate 
forecasts. Second, analysts have to spend resources and efforts on their activities of corporate site 
visits. Based on the fact that every year there are many site visits conducted by financial analysts 
who are assumed to be rational, we believe that benefits from site visits should outweigh the 
costs. Specifically, analysts should experience an improvement in their forecasts accuracy by 
visiting the target firms and such an improvement should be greater than that for non-visiting 
analysts. Otherwise, the site visit costs paid by visiting analysts would not be well justified. In 
summary, we predict a positive relationship between site visits and forecast accuracy. Our first 
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hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H1: The forecast accuracy of visiting analysts improves more after site visits when 
compared to that of non-visiting analysts. 
 
However, we might not find results consistent with H1 because site visits might not be 
useful for making accurate earnings forecasts. Investors’ site visits are usually organized by the 
company and led by the board secretary. It is unclear whether the company has a full control 
over the information flows during the site visits and hence it is possible that analysts rely too 
much on the information conveyed from the organizers rather than discover new information 
actively by themselves. In other words, visiting analysts might not obtain new information or 
even get misleading information fed by the organizers. Thus, it remains an empirical question 
whether the site visits are useful for forecast accuracy as stated in H1.  
The effectiveness of site visits for analyst forecast accuracy likely varies with some 
characteristics of visited firms, visiting analysts, and site visits. First, the usefulness of site visits 
is greater when the costs are lower for acquiring and processing information during site visits.  
As for the information acquisition cost, prior studies show that firms with better corporate 
governance are more transparent in disclosing firm-specific information by issuing management 
forecasts more frequently and precisely (Eng and Mak 2003) (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Karamanou 
and Vafeas 2005). Moreover, well-governed firms are less likely to commit financial frauds 
(Beasley 1996) and are less likely to manipulate earnings numbers (Dechow et al. 1996). It thus 
follows that during the site visits to firms with better governance, the corporate executives are 
less likely to prevent analysts from discovering new information and also less likely to provide 
analysts with misleading earnings information. Therefore, during site visits to firms with better 
corporate governance, visiting analysts face a lower information acquisition cost and are 
expected to possess a larger information advantage over non-visiting analysts.  
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 The usefulness of site visits also depends on analysts’ skills to process the information 
obtained from their site visits. We conjecture that experienced analysts are better at processing 
and understanding the information from site visits. Therefore, visiting analysts are expected to 
obtain a more pronounced information advantage when these analysts have more firm-specific 
experience for the visited firms. These arguments lead to our hypothesis: 
H2: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is more pronounced for visited firms with better corporate governance.  
 
H3: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is more pronounced for more experienced visiting analysts.  
 
Next, the information advantage of visiting analysts is expected to be more pronounced for 
those site visits with higher expected benefits. First, site visits to firms with volatile earnings 
should provide a greater benefit in reducing information uncertainty, and thus help visiting 
analysts to achieve a greater information advantage. A higher level of earnings volatility means 
less stable and less predictable operations, making it more difficult to make accurate earnings 
forecasts. Therefore, new information obtained from site visits is more valuable for earnings 
forecasts for firms with more volatile earnings performance. In addition, firms with higher 
earnings volatility make fewer voluntary disclosures (Waymire 1985), which constrains the 
information sources available for analysts. After all, analysts’ forecast accuracy is positively 
correlated with firm’s disclosure level (Chang et al. 2000; Hope 2003). When facing constrained 
information sources for firms with higher uncertainty of earnings performance, analysts are 
expected to benefit more from their site visits.  
The second situation where site visits provide a great benefit is when visiting a firm with a 
leading position in the industry. Specifically, we conjecture that the market shares of the visited 
firms have a positive impact on the information role of corporate site visits. By visiting a firm 
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with a higher market share, the visiting analysts not only know firm-specific information, but 
also industry-wide or market-wide knowledge. In other words, site visits to industry-leading 
firms provides richer information content than other site visits. Such a richer information content, 
mainly industry or market knowledge, is expected to be useful for analysts to make more 
accurate earnings forecasts. This expectation is based on the important role of analysts’ industry 
knowledge in their forecast performance, as documented in prior studies that industry knowledge 
helps analysts better process information (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004), and that analysts make 
more accurate forecasts when target firms’ operations are more synchronous with industry trend 
(Hutton et al. 2012). We formally state our hypotheses as follows: 
H4: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is more pronounced for visited firms with more volatile earnings.  
 
H5: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is more pronounced for visited firms with greater market shares.  
 
Lastly, we expect the benefits of site visits are contingent on the timing and the participants 
of site visits. As for the timing of site visits, we conjecture that site visits are less beneficial if 
these visits are conducted in a short time interval after any other investors’ site visits to the same 
firm. Such visits preceded by other site visit events should be less informative since managers 
may simply repeat the same information disclosed in the preceding site visits. The possibly pre-
empted information content makes the site visits less useful if these site visits follow any other 
site visit in a short period.  
As for the participants of a site visit tour, we take advantage of the mandatory disclosure of 
visitors’ names for site visits and identify other non-analyst visitors who visit the same firm with 
analysts.  The existence of other non-analyst visitors, especially buy-side fund managers, will 
make the new information during site visit less exclusive to visiting analysts, and hence weakens 
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the usefulness of site visits for visiting analysts to gain the information advantage. Specifically, 
other site visitors, such as fund managers, could spread out the information obtained from site 
visits through their direct trading activities or their communication with other parties who do not 
visit the firm. In this way, other market participants, including non-visiting analysts, get to know 
the new information obtained during site visits. Therefore, visiting analysts are expected to have 
a smaller information advantage over non-visiting analysts, if the site visits are conducted with 
other market participants (i.e., not just visiting analysts on the same field trip). In summary, we 
have the following hypotheses: 
H6: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is less pronounced for site visits preceded by other visits.  
 
H7: The forecast accuracy improvement of visiting analysts compared with non-visiting 
analysts is less pronounced for site visits with other non-analyst visitors.  
 
3 Sample and Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
Data on analysts’ site visits are available in China for recent years. According to the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Information Fair Disclosure Guidelines, effective from 
August 2006, firms listed on the SZSE have to report to the China Securities Regulation 
Committee (CSRC) two working days before site visits conducted by institutional investors, 
financial analysts, mutual fund managers, banks and other visitors. After the site visit, the firm 
has to provide a summary of the site visit to both the CSRC and the SZSE. However, these 
reports are not available to the general public. In 2008, the SZSE implemented a new disclosure 
rule mandating that all listed firms disclose the summary information about every site visit in 
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their annual reports starting from 2009.6 Appendix A provides an example showing that brokers 
have field trips to a firm’s headquarters, operating facilities, and warehouses. 
We hand-collect the site visit records in the annual reports of the firms listed on the SZSE 
for the period of 2009 -2012. Our data include the event dates and the names of the visiting 
institutions. We identify the site visits involved with at least one broker and exclude those 
conducted by other types of visiting institutions such as mutual funds and banks.7 This step leads 
to a total of 18,078 visits, with the yearly number increasing from 2,233 in 2009 to 7,303 in 
2012. The dramatic increase in the frequency of site visits is consistent with the findings in 
Cheng et al. (2013) who document an increased prevalence of site visits conducted by all types 
of investors in China market from 2009 to 2011.8  
We impose additional data restrictions to obtain the final sample. We require the 
availability of analysts’ annual EPS forecasts for the coming year within the six-month period 
prior to site visits. Such a requirement of pre-site visit forecasts is necessary for us to calculate 
the change of forecast accuracy between pre- and post-site visit periods. In addition, there are 
some site visits with adjacent event dates to each other. We combine every two site visits with 
adjacent dates as one site visit. Next, we delete firms in financial industries and firms with 
missing values of actual EPS or stock prices for the calculation of analyst forecast errors. After 
these procedures, we have a remaining sample of 15,496 analysts’ site visits.  
Following our research design of difference-in-difference method, we further impose two 
data screening procedures which cause the major loss of site visit observations. First, we require 
                                               
6 The disclosure of site visits is strictly enforced. The SZSE publicly denounced a few companies that failed to 
disclose site visit information with the SZSE. 
7 Note that when we code the two visit characteristics variables, the number of preceding visits, and the indicator of 
group visits, it is based on the entire site visit database, not constrained to those visits conducted by analysts. 
8 There are a large number of IPO firms in 2011. The larger sample of listed firms also contributes to the large 
increase in the frequency of analysts’ site visits in 2012.  
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the earnings forecasts made by visiting analysts in the whole window around site visits (i.e., six 
months prior to site visit dates until one month after site visits). 9 Without visiting analysts’ 
forecasts, we cannot measure their forecast accuracy. Such requirement results in the exclusion 
of 8,014 analysts’ site visits. The fact that almost a half of the analysts’ site visits are excluded 
suggests that there are many site visits where visiting analysts do not make any forecasts around 
the site visits. Second, to perform the measurement of accuracy improvement, we further require 
at least one forecast made by visiting analysts in the pre-site visit period.10 This procedure leads 
to an additional deduction of 2,394 site visits where visiting analysts make forecast only in the 
post-visit period but none for pre-visit period. Lastly, we impose the same requirement, the 
availability of earnings forecast in the pre-visit period for non-visiting analysts. The final sample 
consists of 4,947 site visits for which we have the data for visiting and non-visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy in both the pre- and post-site visit period. These site visits occur in 1,437 firm-
years for 845 unique firms during 2009-2012. As described in the following sections, we 
calculate the forecast accuracy for the group of visiting and non-visiting analysts, respectively, 
and then use the change in forecast accuracy for these two groups for each site visit event as the 
dependent variable in our regressions. Therefore, for each of 4,947 site visits, we have two 
observations of analyst forecast performance improvement (one for visiting analysts and the 
other for non-visiting analysts), leading to a total of 9,894 observations of analyst performance. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure. 
[Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Empirical Design    
                                               
9 We match analysts’ broker firms in analyst forecast database with the brokers’ names in the site visit database. One 
broker usually has one analyst covering a specific firm. Thus, we use broker and analyst interchangeably when 
discussing forecasts.  
10 Specifically, if an analyst does not issue new forecasts in the post-event period, we will use this analyst’s earnings 
forecasts in the pre-event period as the forecasts during the post-event period.  
17 
 
Our first set of tests investigates whether the forecast accuracy of visiting analysts 
improves more relative to that of non-visiting analysts. For this purpose, we estimate the 
following model:  
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧
+ ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
Where, ߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = −(ܲ݋ݏݐ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ − ܲݎ݁_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ ) with k= visiting or 
non-visiting analyst groups for the site visit occurring at day t to firm j. This variable captures the 
change in forecast accuracy for analyst group k from six months before site visit to one month 
after site visit. More specifically, for each analyst group, we first calculate the mean or median of 
every analyst’s most recent annual EPS forecasts prior to site visit as the consensus forecast of 
this group, and then calculate the pre-site visit absolute forecast errors for this group (i.e., 
Pre_Visit_AFE). The forecast error is measured as the difference between consensus forecast and 
actual EPS, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the firm-year. Similarly, we identify the 
most recent forecasts made by the same group of analysts prior to the one month after site visits, 
calculate their forecast consensus and develop the absolute forecast error for the same group in 
the post-site visit period (i.e., Post_Visit_AFE). Then, we use the difference in forecast accuracy 
between post-site visit and pre-site visit periods (∆AFE) as the dependent variable.  
We add a negative sign to the difference as shown in the formula. In this way, a positive 
value of the dependent variable proxies for an improvement in the forecast accuracy. For each 
site visit, we have two observations of ∆AFE, one for the visiting analysts group and the other 
for non-visiting analysts group. Note that according to our definition, if the visiting (or non-
visiting) analysts do not update their forecasts in the post-event period (i.e., one month after site 
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visit), the post-site visit forecast consensus will be the same as pre-site visit forecast consensus, 
and hence we will document a zero change in forecast accuracy of this group of analysts.  
The main variable of interest is the indicator variable for visiting analysts, Visitk,j,t. It 
equals 1 if the group of analysts consists of those from the visiting brokers as recorded in the 
name of visitors for the site visit event at day t (i.e., when k= visiting), and zero otherwise (i.e., 
when k=non-visiting).  
We control for variables which affect analysts’ forecast accuracy as suggested by prior 
studies. Forecasts issued closer to the earnings announcement dates are generally more accurate 
than earlier forecasts (Clement 1999). As a result, we control for the change in forecast horizon 
(ΔHorizon), measured as the natural logarithm of the difference in the forecasting horizon (the 
number of days) of individual earnings forecasts made by this group of analysts (visiting group 
or non-visiting group) from the pre-visit to the post-visit period. In addition, more experienced 
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate (Mikhail et al. 1997), and thus we control for analysts’ 
firm-specific experience (Firmexp), measured as the natural logarithm of the average firm-
specific experience (the number of years) of all analysts in analyst group k for firm j.11 Moreover, 
prior research finds that forecasts issued by analysts from larger brokers are more accurate 
because large brokers have more resources. We thus control for broker size (Brokersize), defined 
as the average broker firms’ size for analysts of group k and the broker firms’ size is the number 
of unique financial analysts working for the broker firms in this firm-year. Furthermore, as 
suggested by prior literature, the forecast consensus of a larger group of analysts is more accurate. 
Thus we control for the number of analysts in each group of visiting or non-visiting analysts 
(NumANA). Lastly, we also add industry fixed effects to the regression models and report t-
                                               
11 When we use overall experience (Genexp), calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of years since this 
analyst issued his/her first forecast. Results are similar. 
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values based on two-way clustered standard errors by firm and year.12 Appendix B provides 
more detailed variable definitions.  
 
4 Results 
4.1 Univariate tests 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics, separately, for 
visiting and non-visiting observations. We observe significant differences in the forecast 
accuracy changes between these two groups. Specifically, when using mean forecasts for the 
group forecast consensus, we document an improvement of 0.0252 in non-visiting analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. As described in last section, we define ∆AFE as the difference in absolute 
forecast errors between the post-site visit and pre-site visit periods with a negative sign added. 
Hence, a positive value of ∆AFE implies a smaller absolute forecast error for the post-site visit 
period and the improved forecast accuracy. On the other hand, the improvement in visiting 
analysts’ forecast is even greater at 0.0574, which is statistically significantly higher than that of 
non-visiting analysts (t=8.38). The results are similar when comparing the forecast accuracy 
based on the median value of individual forecasts as the forecast consensus of the group (t=8.87). 
Therefore, the univariate analysis shows that visiting analysts experience a greater improvement 
in their forecast accuracy when compared with that for non-visiting analysts.  
However, one should interpret the univariate results with caution because we find that these 
two groups are also significantly different in other dimensions. Compared to forecasts issued by 
non-visiting analysts, forecasts issued by visiting analysts after site visits are closer to forecasts 
issued by visiting analysts before site visits as shown by the smaller change in the horizon for 
visiting analysts than that for non-visiting analysts (85.67 vs. 98.03 days), suggesting that 
                                               
12 We also estimate all regression models using firm fixed effects. Results remain the same. 
20 
 
visiting analysts are more likely to update their forecasts than non-visiting analysts.13 Also, 
visiting analysts are more experienced and are from larger brokers. As shown in Table 3, the two 
groups of analysts are different in all dimensions, suggesting the importance of controlling for 
other analyst and forecast characteristics in the multivariate regressions. 
[Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
Table 3 reports multiple regression results. Note that the reported t-values are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. As reported in the table, we find that the 
coefficient on Visit is significantly positive for both dependent variables of ΔAFE_Mean 
(t=16.01) in column (1) and ΔAFE_Median (t = 14.55) in column (2). Again, according to the 
definition of ΔAFE in last section, the higher value of ΔAFE suggests a higher level of forecast 
accuracy since we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors when defining 
the dependent variable. Therefore, the regression results suggest that visiting analysts improve 
more in terms of forecast accuracy in the periods around site visits than non-visiting analysts 
following the same firm. This finding supports H1 that analysts obtain useful information and 
gain an information advantage through their site visits to listed firms.  
The coefficients of control variables are in line with prior literature. The coefficient on 
ΔHorizon is positive for both specifications, implying that the post-event forecasts are more 
accurate than the pre-event forecasts with a larger gap in timing (i.e., post-event forecasts are 
made at a time closer to earnings announcements). Firm specific experience is also significantly 
positively associated with forecast accuracy improvement (coefficient=0.0148 and 0.0134, 
                                               
13 We find that visiting analysts update their forecasts more often than non-visiting analysts when using the firm-
constant control accuracy measure (untabulated). In that design we divide all analysts following firm j in the current 
year into two groups, a visiting group with analysts who visited firm j in the prior year and a non-visiting group with 
analysts who did not visit firm j in the prior year. We compare the forecast frequency of the visiting group and the 
non-visiting group for the same firm.  
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respectively), which is consistent with the findings in Mikhail et al.(1997). We also find a 
positive coefficient on the number of analysts (NumANA) which suggests a more pronounced 
improvement in forecast accuracy for a larger group of visiting or non-visiting analysts.  
However, the results of negative coefficients on brokerage house size (Brokersize) are not 
consistent with our expectation. Specifically, the negative coefficients suggest that with more 
analysts from larger brokers in the visiting or non-visiting groups, this group experiences a 
smaller improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy in the post-site visit period.  
[Table 3 about here] 
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses 
In this section, we report tests of H2-H7. To test how corporate governance influences the 
role of site visits, we use the two measures of corporate governance, board independence and 
CEO-Chairman duality indicator, and their interaction with visiting indicator in the regressions.  
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܦݑܽ ௝݈,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܦݑܽ ௝݈,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, captures the impact of corporate governance on the 
usefulness of site visits for analysts’ forecast performance.  
As shown in Table 4, the coefficient on interaction item, β3, is significantly negative for 
firms with CEO-Chairman duality (i.e., poor corporate governance) but positive for board 
independence (i.e., good corporate governance). Combined together, these results indicate that 
by conducting site visits to well-governed firms, analysts experience greater improvement in 
forecast accuracy. Thus, H2 is supported. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
To test how analyst experience affects the role of site visits, we construct an analyst 
experience indicator that equals one when the average firm-specific experience of all analysts in 
analyst group k for firm j is greater than the sample median. Note that for this test, we use an 
indicator for firm-specific experience as the control variable (Firmexp):    
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, captures the impact of analyst experience on the 
usefulness of site visits for analysts’ forecast accuracy. Table 5 presents the regression results. 
As hypothesized in H3, the coefficient on the interaction term, β3, is significantly positive for 
both specifications (t=1.83 and 3.57, respectively). Therefore, more experienced analysts are 
better at taking advantage of the information obtained from site visits and experience larger 
improvement in forecast accuracy. Our H3 is supported. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 reports the results for H4. We measure the uncertainty of earnings performance as 
the standard deviation of net income for firm j in the past five years.14 We then add the earnings 
volatility and its interaction with the site visit indicator to the model:  
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The coefficient, β3, is positive and significant at the 0.01 level as shown in columns (1) and (2). 
This indicates that site visits to highly volatile firms are more beneficial for analysts, consistent 
with H4.  
                                               
14 We use an alternative measure of CEO duality measured as the indicator variable that equals to 1 when a CEO for 
firm j serves as the chairman of the board in year t, and 0 otherwise. Results are the same. 
23 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
We then add the market share and its interaction with the site visit indicator to the model:  
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܯܵܪܣܴܧ௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܯܵܪܣܴܧ௝,௧ + ߛଵܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
+ ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show a positive coefficient on the interaction item 
(t=2.46 and 2.95, respectively). These results indicate that analysts benefit more by conducting 
site visits to firms with larger market shares. Hence, our H5 is supported.  
Lastly, we develop the number of preceding site visits within one month prior to current 
site visit (Preceding_visits); and the indicator for site visits without other non-analyst visitors 
(Pure); and their interaction with site visit indicator in the model: 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܲݑݎ ௝݁,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܲݑݎ ௝݁,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௝,௧
+ ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧
+ ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
As shown in Table 7, the coefficient β3 is positive for regressions using the indicator for 
site visits conducted by only visiting analysts; and negative for regressions using the number of 
preceding site visits. These results indicate that analysts benefit less from conducting site visits 
with preceding visits, or conducting site visits with other investors. Our H6 and H7 are supported. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
5 Additional Analyses  
5.1 Site visits and analysts’ geographic distance to firms 
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Malloy(2005) finds that local analysts outperform their distant counterparts in terms of 
forecast accuracy. This home bias effect is robust in other settings.15 However, the mechanism 
through which geographic proximity creates information advantage remains unexplored.16 The 
literature focues more on “whether location matters,” and less on “why location matters.” In this 
section we examine one potential source of information advantage: analysts’ corporate site visits. 
Bae et al.(2008) propose that a plausible explanation for the local information advantage is that 
analysts gain access to soft information, on-site observation of the operation activities, and direct 
interaction with executives. This explanation has largely been taken as a given and no study yet 
provides a direct test on how local analysts gain local information advantage.  
To examine whether analysts’ site visits explain the relationship between geographic 
proximity and information advantage, we compare coefficients on geographic proximity with 
and without controlling for site visits for analyst forecast accuracy. If the significant positive 
relationship between geographic proximity and forecast accuracy becomes insignificant when the 
site visit indicator is controlled for, then the effect of geographic proximity on information 
advantage is largely driven by the site visit effect.  
Table 8 presents the results. We use the geographic distance as independent variables in 
column (1), and we add the site visit indicator to the regression model in column (2). We find 
that after adding the site visit indicator, the coefficient of geographic distance changes from 
significantly negative in Column (1) to insignificant in Column (2). This suggests that site visits 
                                               
15 Geographic proximity or “home bias” may influence a variety of economic behaviors. These include holding a 
higher proportion of local stocks in investment portfolios (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001), higher returns of fund 
investors on their investments in local firms (Coval and Moskowitz 2001), more accurate forecasts by analysts about 
firms in closer proximity to their own brokerage firms (Malloy 2005), and higher acquirer returns for acquisitions 
within closer geographic proximity (Uysal et al. 2008).   
16 Malloy(2005) conjectures that this is because local analysts have information advantage over other analysts but he 
did not formally test this hypothesis. He only presents indirect evidence that geography effects are strongest for 
firms located in small cities and remote areas, where the access to private information is likely to be strongest and 
competition for that information is weakest. 
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contribute to home bias: The geographic distance is not really an information barrier as long as 
analysts are willing to pay site visits to companies.  
If conducting site visits help analysts gain information advantage, we examine whether 
analysts with geographic proximity benefit more from site visits. We add the geographic distance 
and its interaction with the site visit indicator to the following equation: 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
As reported in Table 8, we find a negative coefficient on the interaction item. This result 
shows that local analysts benefit more from site visits to local firms. Our results complement 
prior studies of analysts’ local advantage by showing a mechanism (i.e., by visiting local firms) 
through which local analysts have an information advantage over non-local analysts. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
5.2 The market reaction to earnings forecasts 
In this section we investigate whether the market reaction of the forecasts issued by a 
visiting analyst is stronger than that of the forecasts issued by a non-visiting analyst. For this 
purpose, we estimate the following OLS model:  
ܣܤܵܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܱܰܧ௝,௧ + ߛଵܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଶܩ݁݊݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧
+ ߛସܣܰܣ௝,௧ + ߛହܤܯ௝,௧ + ߛ଺ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛ଻ܷܴܱܸܶܰܧ ௝ܴ,௧ + ߛ଼ܴ݁ݐ_ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧
+ ߛଽܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉21௝,௧ + ߛଵ଴ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉252௝,௧ ++ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௝,௧ 
 
We use stock price changes during the [-1, +1] event window of analysts’ forecasts to 
capture the market reaction to analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, we measure the market reaction 
to analyst forecasts using the absolute abnormal returns (ABSAR), calculated as the absolute 
value of the cumulated market adjusted abnormal returns in the three-day [-1, +1] window. We 
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use an estimation period of 250 days in the forecast window [-251, -2] and we require at least 
150 trading day observations in this estimation period. 
Considering that multiple brokers may issue forecasts for the same firm on the same day, 
the market reaction for a specific event window can result from a combination of both forecasts 
issued by visiting analysts and non-visiting analysts. We use two ways to code the indicator of 
site visits. The indicator variable of site visits (Visit_ONE) is coded as 1 if any analyst that issues 
forecasts on the event day is associated with a broker that has visited firm j in the prior year, or 0 
otherwise. The indicator variable of site visits (Visit_MAJ) is coded as 1 if more than half of the 
analysts who issue forecasts on the event day are associated with brokers that have visited firm j 
in the prior year, or 0 otherwise.  
To investigate the effect of site visits on the market reaction to analysts’ forecasts, we run a 
regression of abnormal absolute returns on Visit_ONE or Visit_MAJ, after controlling for all 
forecast-level and analyst-level control variables, as in our main tests, and firm characteristics 
such as firm size, intangibility, leverage, book to market ratio, return volatility, and stock 
momentum. To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by those observations that 
coincide with other information disclosure, we exclude event days that fall within the [-1, +1] 
time window of annual reports, semi-annual reports, and quarterly reports. 
Table 9 reports regression results. We find that the market reacts more strongly to forecasts 
when at least one analyst on the forecast issuance day is associated with a visiting broker (t=2.36) 
or when more than half of the analysts on a forecast day are associated with visiting brokers 
(t=2.06). 
[Table 9 about here] 
6 Conclusion 
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This study examines how analysts’ active information acquisition efforts affect their 
forecast performance. Using the mandatory disclosure of analysts’ corporate site visits in China, 
we find that the earnings forecasts issued by analysts who conduct site visits to the target firm, 
are more accurate than those issued by non-visiting analysts, as evidenced by the greater 
improvement of forecast accuracy in the post-site visit period. The relative accuracy 
improvement is more pronounced for firms with better corporate governance, for firms with 
more volatile earnings, for firms with greater market share, and for analysts with longer firm-
specific experience. Further evidence shows that the usefulness of site visits can be preempted by 
preceding visits, and can be diluted by the existence of other visitors in the same site visit. These 
results suggest that corporate site visits play an important role in analysts’ information advantage.  
The additional analyses enforce the importance of site visits by showing that geographic 
proximity increases the usefulness of analysts’ site visits and that the market reaction to visiting 
analysts’ forecasts is larger than that to the forecasts made by non-visiting analysts.  
Overall, our study shows evidence that analysts forecast accuracy is promoted by these 
analysts’ actively acquisition activities which are usually not observable and hence cannot be 
identified by prior studies. This paper also provide complementary evidence for the select access 
literature, especially studies on investors’ site visits, by showing the mechanism through which 
the site visits convey information into the capital market – analysts incorporate the information 
from site visits into their earnings forecasts by making more accurate earnings forecasts.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
A site visit example: Extract of the 2011 annual report of Shenzhen MTC Co., Ltd. 
 
Details of site visits are as follows during the reporting period: 
 
Time Place Visitor Content of discussion and materials provided 
Sep. 13 2011 Headquarters CITIC Securities The general situation of the export business of 
high definition digital receivers and LCD TVs; 
the general situation of the overseas market; the 
present development status of LED and LED 
packaging; the future development strategy of the 
company. 
 Dec. 1, 2011 Headquarters Zhongshan Securities, 
Hangzhou Yinhe 
Management 
Production and operation in the company’s first 
three quarters; the business model and the supply 
chain management of the company; the general 
trends in the industry. 
 Dec. 8, 2011 Fuyong 
Factory, 
Shajing 
Factory, 
Zhaochi 
Industrial 
Park 
Shanghai Securities 
News, Securities Times, 
Securities Daily, China 
Securities Journal, Lion 
Fund Management, 
Goldstate Securities, GF 
Securities, Shenzhen 
Wansheng Investment 
Management 
Brief introduction to the company, its products 
and product lines, business model, core 
competitive advantage, sales in the first three 
quarters, LED business development status, and 
investment philosophy; the development plan and 
the size of Zhao Chi Industrial Park. 
 Dec. 28, 2011 Fuyong 
Factory, 
Shajing 
Factory, 
Zhaochi 
Industrial 
Park  
China Securities Journal, 
Guosen Securities, China 
Merchants Securities, 
Huaxi Securities, Hwabao 
Securities, Great Wall 
Securities 
Brief introduction to the company, its products 
and product lines, business model, core 
competitive advantage, sales in the first three 
quarters, LED business development status, and 
investment philosophy; the development plan and 
the size of Zhao Chi Industrial Park. 
 
In the reporting period, the company received eight site visits from investors and analysts. During these 
site visits, the company strictly followed the regulations in the Guidelines of Fair Information Disclosure 
for Companies Listed on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, the Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for Standardized Operation of Companies 
Listed on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Board, and the internal guidelines of information 
disclosure and investor relationship management of the company. The company fairly treats each investor 
during the site visit process. Investors have to register with the company before their site visits; investors 
are strongly suggested to avoid those dates that coincide with other significant information disclosure 
time windows when scheduling site visits. Before site visits, all visitors are required to sign an agreement 
to follow the company’s site visit policy, and during the site visits, visitors are accompanied by more than 
two staff members of the company, who shall record the conversation and report it to the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable definitions  
 
Panel A: Variable definitions for the forecast accuracy analysis 
 
Dependent Variables 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = −(ܲ݋ݏݐ_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ − ܲݎ݁_ܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ ) 
 
ΔAFE_Meank,j,t = The change of absolute forecast error of analyst group k for firm j from 6 
months before site visit event t to 1 month after site visit event t. We 
added a negative sign to the difference so that a positive value implies 
the improvement in forecast accuracy. k marks two types of analyst 
groups for each site visit event t, the visiting-group or the non-visiting 
group. More specifically, based on whether an analyst visits firm j on a 
site visit event day t, we identify a group of visiting analysts and a group 
of non-visiting analysts for each site visit event t. for each analyst group, 
we first calculate the mean or median of every analyst’s most recent 
annual EPS forecasts prior to site visit as the consensus forecast of this 
group, and then calculate the pre-site visit absolute forecast errors for 
this group (i.e., Pre_Visit_AFE). The forecast error is measured as the 
difference between consensus forecast and actual EPS, scaled by stock 
price at the beginning of the firm-year.  Similarly, we identify the most 
recent forecasts made by the same group of analysts prior to the one 
month after site visits, calculate their forecast consensus and develop the 
absolute forecast error for the same group in the post-site visit period 
(i.e., Post_Visit_AFE). Then, we use the difference in forecast accuracy 
between post-site visit and pre-site visit periods (∆AFE).        
 
ΔAFE_Mediank,j,t = Similar as above, only that we calculate the pre_visit_AFE or 
post_visit_AFE on the basis of forecast consensus proxied by the median 
value of forecasts made by this group of analysts.  
 
Key Variable   
Visitk,j,t = An indicator variable of whether individual analyst forecasts are issued 
by an analyst associated with a visiting broker. Coded as 1 if analyst i is 
associated with a visiting broker. Visiting brokers are coded based on 
specific site visit events. For each site visit event t, we identify the 
brokers who visited on the site visit event day t and t-1 as visiting 
analysts and all other analysts as non-visiting analysts. 
   
Variables for Cross-sectional analyses 
Dual = An indicator variable that equals to 1 if the Chairman and the CEO is the 
same individual for firm j in current year, and 0 otherwise. 
Indep = The ratio of the number of independent directors to all directors for firm j 
in current year. 
NI_std = The standard deviation of net income for firm j, which equals to the 
standard deviation of net income during past five years (including 
current year) 
MSHARE = Market share of firm j in current year, which equals to revenue of the 
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firm j devided by the total revenue of all firms in same 3-digit CSRC 
industry. 
Pure = An indicator of pure visits, which equals to 1 if all visitors are visiting 
analysts and there is no any other non-analyst visitor (such as fund or 
bank etc), and 0 otherwise. 
Preceding_visits = The logged number of site visits of firm j within one month before the 
current site visit t. 
Distance = The median of the geographic distance between all brokers in group k 
and firm j in current year. 
   
   
Control Variables  
Δhorizonk,j,t = The change of average forecast horizon of analyst group k (visiting 
group or non-visiting group) from pre-visit to post-visit. Forecast horizon 
is defined as the number of calendar days between the forecast issue date 
and the corresponding earnings announcement dates. 
Firmexp = Analyst firm-specific experience, designed as the log transformation of 
average firm-specific experience of all analysts in analyst group k for 
firm j. Firm specific experience is the time interval in years between his 
first forecast for a particular firm j and his current forecast for firm j. 
Brokersize = Broker size, defined as the average number of analysts working for the 
brokers in group k. 
NumANA = The log transformation of the number of analysts in each group k.  
MV = The log transformation of the market value of equity of firm j at the end 
day of last fiscal year. 
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Panel B: Variable definitions for the analysis of forthcoming earnings news  
               (Firm-year-event day level) 
 
Dependent Variables 
ABSAR = The absolute 3-day model-adjusted cumulated abnormal returns around a 
forecast issued by analyst i of firm j’s fiscal year T earnings. The market 
model is estimated based on day -251 to day -2 and at least 150 
observations are required for estimating the market model within this 
period. 
   
Independent Variables  
Visit_ONE = An indicator variable for analyst site visits on the forecast event day. It is 
coded as 1 if at least one analyst who issue forecast on the event day is 
associated with a visiting broker. To identify a visiting broker we 
perform same procedure as when coding the variable Visit. 
Visit_MAJ = An indicator variable for analyst site visits on the forecast event day. It is 
coded as 1 if more than half of the analysts who issue forecasts on the 
event day are associated with visiting brokers. To identify a visiting 
broker we perform same procedure as when coding the variable Visit. 
 
Control Variables – Broker Level 
Δhorizon = Number of calendar days between the forecast issue date and the 
corresponding earnings announcement dates. (Demeaned) 
Brokersize = Broker size, defined as the number of analysts working for the brokerage 
firm that analyst i is associated with. (Demeaned) 
Firmexp = Analyst firm-specific experience, designed as the log transformation of 
the time interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast for a particular 
firm j and his forecast at time t for firm j. (Demeaned) 
Genexp = Analyst general experience, defined as the log transformation of the time 
interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast in the CSMAR 
database and the current forecast at time t. (Demeaned) 
 
Control Variables – Firm Level 
ANA = Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of analysts that cover firm j 
in year T. 
BM = The book-to-market ratio of firm j at the fiscal year end prior to the 
forecast event date. 
Size = The natural logarithm of the market value of the firm j at the fiscal year 
end prior to the forecast event date. 
TURNOVER = The average monthly share turnover of firm j, computed as volume 
divided by shares outstanding, over the 63 days prior to the forecast 
event date. 
Ret_Volatility = Standard deviation of daily returns of firm j over the 63 days prior to the 
forecast event date. 
Momentum21 = Stock return of firm j over the 21 trading days prior to the forecast event 
date. 
Momentum252 = Stock return of firm j over the prior 252 trading days prior to the 
recommendation, excluding the 21 trading days prior to the 
recommendation. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection 
 
This table reports the sample selection procedure for our sample of analysts’ site visits during the period of 2009-2012 
  
# of total 
site visits 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Site visits involved with brokerage firms. 18,078 2,233 3,860 4,682 7,303 
Requiring at least one analyst forecast for annual EPS of the 
coming year in the period of 6 months prior to site visit dates.   
16,849 1,955 3,548 4,430 6,995 
Combining site visits with adjacent event dates as one event. 15,787 1,832 3,320 4,131 6,504 
Deleting the firms in the financial industries and those firms 
without data for the calculation of forecast accuracy.  
15,476 1,754 3,222 4,057 6,443 
Requiring earnings forecasts made by visiting analysts in the period 
of six months prior to site visits to one month after site visits  
7,462 681 1,564 1,909 3,308 
Requiring at least one earnings forecast made by visiting analysts in 
the pre-site visit period of six months prior to site visits 
5,068 387 944 1,293 2,444 
Requiring earnings forecast accuracy for non-visiting analyst group 
in both the pre-site visit and post-site visit periods 
4,947 367 915 1,263 2,402 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics for the subsamples of visiting analysts and non-visiting analysts  
 
This table shows summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The sample firms are 
9,894 group forecasts, including 4,947 forecasts issued by visiting groups and non-visiting groups, 
respectively. We add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit 
and post-site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. 
Please see Appendix B for the variable definitions. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. 
 
Variables  
Visit=0(A)  Visit=1(B)  B-A 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean  
(t-test) 
Median 
(Wilcoxon test) 
ΔAFE_Mean 0.0252 0.0000 
 
0.0574 0.0000 
 
8.38*** 4.08*** 
ΔAFE_Median 0.0229 0.0000 
 
0.0590 0.0000 
 
8.87*** 0.49 
Δhorizon_Mean 98.0362 94.8333 
 
85.6684 76.0000 
 
-15.1*** -20.59*** 
Δhorizon_Median 93.2326 87.0000 
 
85.3490 74.0000 
 
-8.57*** -11.7*** 
Firmexp_Mean 2.3234 2.0000 
 
2.5672 2.0000 
 
7.56*** 2.54** 
Firmexp_Median 2.2092 2.0000 
 
2.5661 2.0000 
 
10.7*** 5.78*** 
Brokersize_Mean 30.6500 30.5000 
 
35.4187 36.0000 
 
25.09*** 25.67*** 
Brokersize_Median 30.4690 30.0000  35.4231 36.0000  25.08*** 25.61*** 
No. of obs. 4,947 
 
4,947 
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TABLE 3 
The change of forecast accuracy for visiting and non-visiting analysts around site visits. 
 
This table presents the OLS regressions result of forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator, 
analyst characteristics, and control variables.  
	߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ 	
+ ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ 	+ ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. The full 
sample consists of 9,894 forecasts in the period of 2009-2012. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see 
Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
Variables 
Column (1) Column (2) 
ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median 
Visit 0.0391*** 0.0408*** 
 
(16.01) (14.55) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0169*** 
 
 
(3.01) 
 
Firmexp_Mean 0.0148*** 
 
 
(5.20) 
 
Brokersize_Mean -0.0276*** 
 
 
(-2.77) 
 
Δhorizon_Median 
 
0.0192*** 
  
(2.94) 
Firmexp_Median  0.0134*** 
  (4.83) 
Brokersize_Median  -0.0254*** 
  (-3.48) 
NumANA 0.0156*** 0.0165*** 
 
(3.54) (4.02) 
MV -0.0057*** -0.0060*** 
 
(-2.92) (-3.84) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 9,894 9,894 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.014 
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TABLE 4   
The effect of firms’ corporate governance on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits  
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator, 
conditional on duality and board independence. 
 
Column(1)-(2) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, duality 
indicator, and their interaction term based on the following model. The duality indicator variable (Dual) 
equals to 1 if the manager and chair director are same, 0 otherwise. 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܦݑܽ ௝݈,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܦݑܽ ௝݈,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
Column(3)-(4) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, the 
independence of director, and their interaction term based on the following model. The board 
independence variable (Indep) equals to the percentage of independent directors on board. 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܫ݊݀݁݌௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
+ ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. The full 
sample consists of 9,894 forecasts in the 2009-2012 periods. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see 
Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
Variables 
CEO-Chairman Duality  Board Independence 
Column (1) Column (2)  Column (3) Column (4) 
ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median  ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median 
      
Visit 0.0428*** 0.0450***  0.0159** 0.0235** 
 (12.99) (10.38)  (2.49) (2.33) 
Dual 0.0016 0.0031    
 (0.94) (1.51)    
Visit*Dual -0.0126*** -0.0141**    
 (-3.19) (-2.30)    
Indep    -0.0256 -0.0158 
    (-0.85) (-0.84) 
Visit*Indep    0.0621*** 0.0462** 
    (4.90) (2.10) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0175***   0.0167***  
 (3.28)   (2.94)  
Firmexp_Mean 0.0147***   0.0151***  
 (5.88)   (5.29)  
Brokersize_Mean -0.0269**   -0.0267**  
 (-2.57)   (-2.51)  
Δhorizon_Median  0.0196***   0.0191*** 
  (3.12)   (2.89) 
Firmexp_Median  0.0132***   0.0136*** 
  (5.26)   (4.85) 
Brokersize_Median  -0.0247***   -0.0244*** 
  (-3.17)   (-3.04) 
NumANA 0.0155*** 0.0165***  0.0160*** 0.0168*** 
 (3.48) (3.94)  (3.54) (4.06) 
MV -0.0059*** -0.0062***  -0.0056*** -0.0059*** 
 (-2.94) (-3.75)  (-2.72) (-3.59) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations 9,840 9,840  9,852 9,852 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.014  0.013 0.013 
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TABLE 5   
The effect of analysts’ firm-specific experience on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
 
This table reports the analysis of forecast accuracy changes of visiting analysts and non-visiting analysts 
with analysts’ characteristic (Firmexp), based on the following model:  
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. The full 
sample consists of 9,894 forecasts in the period of 2009-2012. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see 
Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
Variables 
Column (1) Column (2) 
ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median 
Visit 0.0303*** 0.0308*** 
 
(5.24) (6.39) 
Firmexp 0.0142** 0.0104*** 
 (2.52) (3.64) 
Visit* Firmexp 0.0127* 0.0172*** 
 (1.83) (3.57) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0170*** 
 
 (2.98) 
 Brokersize_Mean -0.0266*** 
 
 (-2.76) 
 Δhorizon_Median 
 
0.0191*** 
 
 
(2.88) 
Brokersize_Median  -0.0245*** 
  (-3.46) 
NumANA 0.0155*** 0.0163*** 
 (2.92) (3.52) 
MV -0.0051*** -0.0054*** 
 (-2.61) (-4.22) 
Industry Fixed Effects 0.0072 0.0148 
 
  Observations 9,894 9,894 
Adj. R2 0.014 0.014 
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TABLE 6 
The effect of firms’ earnings volatility and market shares on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator, 
conditional on earnings volatility and market share. 
 
Column(1)-(2) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, earnings 
volatility, and their interaction term based on the following model. The earnings volatility (NI_std) is the 
standard deviation of net income during past five years (including current year). 
 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܰܫ_ݏݐ݀௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
+ ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
Column(3)-(4) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, the market 
share, and their interaction term based on the following model. The market share (MSHARE) equal to 
Sales of firm j divided by the sum of sales of all listed firms that belong to the same first 3-digit CSRC 
industrial code in year t. 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܯܵܪܣܴܧ௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܯܵܪܣܴܧ௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
+ ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. The full 
sample consists of 9,894 forecasts in the 2009-2012 periods. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see 
Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
Variables 
Volatility of net income  Market share 
Column (1) Column (2)  Column (3) Column (4) 
ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median  ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median 
      
Visit 0.0288*** 0.0266***  0.0368*** 0.0382*** 
 (15.49) (11.91)  (15.42) (12.36) 
NI_std 0.0721* 0.0266    
 (1.85) (0.55)    
Visit*NI_std 0.1947*** 0.2568***    
 (4.68) (4.63)    
MSHARE    0.0312 0.0347 
    (1.50) (1.09) 
Visit*MSHARE    0.0471** 0.0512*** 
    (2.46) (2.95) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0178***   0.0166***  
 (2.98)   (2.93)  
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Firmexp_Mean 0.0173***   0.0144***  
 (5.59)   (4.14)  
Brokersize_Mean -0.0285***   -0.0270**  
 (-2.76)   (-2.56)  
Δhorizon_Median  0.0198***   0.0189*** 
  (2.89)   (2.84) 
Firmexp_Median  0.0151***   0.0129*** 
  (4.89)   (3.89) 
Brokersize_Median  -0.0261***   -0.0248*** 
  (-3.45)   (-3.15) 
NumANA 0.0145*** 0.0158***  0.0149*** 0.0158*** 
 (2.75) (3.27)  (4.43) (4.87) 
MV -0.0066** -0.0069***  -0.0068*** -0.0072 
 (-2.20) (-2.63)  (-5.47) (.) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Observations 9,734 9,734  9,842 9,842 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016  0.013 0.013 
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TABLE 7   
The effect of preceding site visits and other visitors on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator, 
conditional on group visits and preceding visits. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, pure 
visits indicator, and their interaction term based on the following model. The pure visits indicator variable 
(Pure), equal to 1 if the broker went to site visit together with other brokers, but not any other visitors, 
such as fund or bank etc, 0 otherwise. 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܲݑݎ ௝݁,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܲݑݎ ௝݁,௧ + ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
Column(3)-(4) report the regression results of forecasts accuracy change on the visit indicator, the 
preceding visits, and their interaction term based on the following model. The preceding visits variable 
(Preceding_visits), is the logged number of site visits that precede the current one in the time window of 
the prior 1 month before event date. 
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܲݎ݁ܿ݁݀݅݊݃_ݒ݅ݏ݅ݐݏ௝,௧
+ ߛଵ߂ܪ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧
+ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧ 
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. The full 
sample consists of 9,894 forecasts in the period of 2009-2012. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. Please see 
Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
 
Variables 
Pure visit  Preceding visit 
Column (1) Column (2)  Column (3) Column (4) 
ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median  ΔAFE_Mean ΔAFE_Median 
      
Visit 0.0333*** 0.0329***  0.0428*** 0.0425*** 
 (7.29) (6.94)  (17.11) (16.11) 
Pure 0.0007 -0.0031    
 (0.18) (-0.79)    
Visit*Pure 0.0188** 0.0256***    
 (2.48) (3.17)    
Preceding_visits    -0.0008 -0.0014 
    (-0.48) (-0.85) 
Visit*Preceding_visits    -0.0022*** -0.0010*** 
    (-2.82) (-5.28) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0177***   0.0172***  
 (3.75)   (2.95)  
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Firmexp_Mean 0.0119***   0.0147***  
 (2.60)   (5.27)  
Brokersize_Mean -0.0269***   -0.0273***  
 (-3.21)   (-2.80)  
Δhorizon_Median  0.0200***   0.0195*** 
  (4.70)   (2.86) 
Firmexp_Median  0.0109**   0.0132*** 
  (2.46)   (4.81) 
Brokersize_Median  -0.0241***   -0.0251*** 
  (-3.05)   (-3.56) 
NumANA 0.0102 0.0116*  0.0164*** 0.0172*** 
 (1.54) (1.77)  (4.11) (4.68) 
MV -0.0006 -0.0016  -0.0052** -0.0055** 
 (-0.16) (-0.40)  (-2.11) (-2.50) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0224 -0.0206  0.0927*** 0.0742*** 
 (-0.26) (-0.23)  (6.90) (2.64) 
      
Observations 9,894 9,894  9,894 9,894 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.015  0.013 0.014 
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TABLE 8  
The effect of geographic proximity on the usefulness of analysts’ site visits 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator, 
and distance in following model:  
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧
+ ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧ + ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
߂ܣܨܧ௞,௝,௧ = α + ߚଵܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߚଶܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ + ߚଷܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ௞,௝,௧ ∗ ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛଵ߂ℎ݋ݎ݅ݖ݋݊௞,௝,௧
+ ߛଶܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௞,௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁௞,௝,௧ + ߛସܰݑ݉ܣܰܣ௞,௝,௧ + ߛହܯ ௝ܸ,௧ + ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧
+ ߝ௞,௝,௧  
 
The dependent variable is the change of forecast accuracy for every group (ΔAFE). In the definition of 
ΔAFE, we add a negative sign to the difference in absolute forecast errors between pre-site visit and post-
site visit periods, and a positive value of ΔAFE implies the improvement in forecast accuracy. Distance is 
indicator variable, equal to 1 if the average geographic distance between the headquarters of firm j and all 
analysts who follow this firm is greater than the median, 0 otherwise. Control variables are shown in 
Panel A of Appendix B. Column (1) reports the regression results of forecast accuracy change on the 
geographic distance based on the first model above, and Column (2) reports the regression results of 
forecast accuracy change on the site visit indicator and the geographic distance based on the second 
model above, Column (3) reports the regression results of forecast accuracy change on the site visit 
indicator ,the geographic distance, and their interaction term. The t-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. 
 
 
Variables 
ΔAFE_Mean  ΔAFE_Median 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Distance -0.0045 -0.0006 0.0039*  -0.0068*** -0.0025 0.0003 
 (-1.32) (-0.17) (1.72)  (-3.01) (-1.14) (0.11) 
Visit  0.0389*** 0.0433***   0.0404*** 0.0433*** 
  (14.70) (16.45)   (14.57) (11.46) 
Visit*Distance   -0.0089**    -0.0058 
   (-2.23)    (-0.83) 
Δhorizon_Mean 0.0081* 0.0171*** 0.0171***     
 (1.74) (2.97) (2.98)     
Firmexp_Mean 0.0138*** 0.0148*** 0.0148***     
 (4.20) (5.22) (5.19)     
Brokersize_Mean -0.0186** -0.0272*** -0.0268***     
 (-2.00) (-2.73) (-2.66)     
Δhorizon_Median     0.0146** 0.0193*** 0.0194*** 
     (2.24) (2.91) (2.92) 
Firmexp_Median     0.0153*** 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 
45 
 
     (4.40) (4.86) (4.86) 
Brokersize_Median     -0.0159** -0.0248*** -0.0246*** 
     (-2.42) (-3.45) (-3.34) 
NumANA 0.0154*** 0.0158*** 0.0157***  0.0152*** 0.0167*** 0.0166*** 
 (3.22) (3.64) (3.62)  (3.59) (4.12) (4.10) 
MV -0.0051*** -0.0057*** -0.0057***  -0.0059*** -0.0059*** -0.0059*** 
 (-2.86) (-3.24) (-3.21)  (-3.72) (-4.11) (-4.09) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 9,886 9,886 9,886  9,886 9,886 9,886 
Adj. R2 0.004 0.013 0.013  0.004 0.013 0.013 
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TABLE 9 
Market reaction to earnings forecasts issued by visiting analysts 
 
This table reports the analysis of how market reacts to forecasts issued by analysts associated with visiting 
brokers based on the following model: 
 
ܣܤܵܣ ௝ܴ,௧ = α + ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܱܰܧ௝,௧ + ߛଵܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଶܩ݁݊݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସܣܰܣ௝,௧
+ ߛହܤܯ௝,௧ + ߛ଺ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛ଻ܷܴܱܸܶܰܧ ௝ܴ,௧ + ߛ଼ܴ݁ݐ_ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଽܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉21௝,௧
+ ߛଵ଴ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉252௝,௧ ++ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௝,௧  
ܣܤܵܣ ௝ܴ ,௧ = α+ ߚଵܸ݅ݏ݅ݐ_ܯܣܬ௝,௧ + ߛଵܨ݅ݎ݉݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଶܩ݁݊݁ݔ݌௝,௧ + ߛଷܤݎ݋݇݁ݎݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସܣܰܣ௝,௧
+ ߛହܤܯ௝,௧ + ߛ଺ܵ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛ଻ܷܴܱܸܶܰܧ ௝ܴ,௧ + ߛ଼ܴ݁ݐ_ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଽܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉21௝,௧
+ ߛଵ଴ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉252௝,௧ + +ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝,௧ + ߝ௝,௧ 
 
The variable definitions are shown in Panel B of Appendix B. The full sample consists of 12,477 unique 
forecast date in the 2009-2011 periods. Column (1) and (2) report the regression results when dependent 
variable (ABSAR) is the absolute value of cumulated abnormal returns in the 3-day event window 
centered on analyst forecast based on market model. While Column (3) and (4) report the regression 
results based on market adjusted model (e.g. abnormal return equal to the difference between individual 
stock price and value-weighted market returns). The t-values in parentheses are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, * indicate the coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed statistical tests. 
 
Variables 
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
ABSAR ABSAR ABSARAJ ABSARAJ 
Visit_ONE 0.0017** 
 
0.0019*** 
 
 
(2.36) 
 
(2.65) 
 
Visit_MAJ 
 
0.0014** 
 
0.0016** 
  
(2.06) 
 
(2.12) 
Firmexp 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
 
(3.51) (4.01) (4.05) (3.73) 
Genexp 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 
(4.84) (4.90) (4.59) (4.62) 
Brokersize -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 
(-0.54) (-0.37) (-0.63) (-0.41) 
ANA -0.0018** -0.0022*** -0.0015** -0.0021*** 
 
(-2.45) (-3.92) (-2.11) (-3.05) 
BM -0.0075** -0.0063*** -0.0082*** -0.0067** 
 
(-2.51) (-2.81) (-2.81) (-2.40) 
Size -0.0010** -0.0004 -0.0010** -0.0004 
 
(-1.98) (-1.03) (-2.17) (-0.80) 
TURNOVER 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 
 
(1.13) (1.59) (1.23) (1.31) 
Ret_Volatility 0.0117*** 0.0129*** 0.0101*** 0.0113*** 
 
(6.24) (7.91) (5.27) (5.95) 
Momentum21 0.0176*** 0.0179*** 0.0193*** 0.0196*** 
 
(6.13) (7.95) (6.59) (6.63) 
Momentum252 0.0016** 0.0018*** 0.0018** 0.0020*** 
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(2.02) (3.21) (2.43) (2.65) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1011*** 0.0918*** 0.0965*** 0.0858*** 
 
(9.11) (10.08) (9.26) (8.25) 
     
Observations 12,477 12,477 12,477 12,477 
Adj. R2 0.031 0.027 0.030 0.026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
